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In his poem The world is too much with us William Wordsworth bemoans the 
instrumentality and materialism of modem life and our distancing from nature. The 
opening lines are as follows: 
The world is too much with us; late and soon, 
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers; 
(Wordsworth, 1802/2000, p. 270) 
Professor Koyasu's paper, 'Three components of happiness; Synthesising a sense of 
competence, a vital sense of life, and a sense of accomplishment', highlights the 
difficulties facing humanity by virtue of the conditions of our existence in modem 
societies. These problems are exemplified in the practices to be found in the failure of 
many contemporary educational institutions to develop the capabilities of learners. 
This failure, he tells us, 'raise[ s] a serious question concerning the state of the 
human mind.' He directs our attention to the role of education in actualising human 
capacities, a process that at its best goes far beyond a mere acquisition of information 
to developing a 'sense of capability through the acquisition of knowledge and skill, 
and a vital sense of life through connection with nature and society.' His recognition 
of the poverty of much institutional practice that goes under the name of education 
contrasts with the 'academic atmosphere of freedom; one that values self-study and 
self-learning rather than the mere inculcation of knowledge', the sort of atmosphere 
he contends that provided the conditions for the many Nobel Laureates at Kyoto 
University (Koyasu, 2010). 
In my reading of Professor Koyasu's paper two themes stood out in relation to 
philosophy and education; first, his emphasis on academic freedom and self-
motivated learning; and second, his study of optimism/pessimism, positive 
orientations, and feelings of happiness. 
I read his reference to self study/self learning and its opposition to the mere 
inculcation of knowledge as a signal to a conception of learning and intellect that 
takes us far beyond any popular notion of individual study. It is a reference to a 
vitality ('vital minds and non-vital minds') that might be best understood in terms of 
self-determination-a self motivation that cannot be grasped simply by reference to a 
liberal atomist conception of autonomy. The critical literature on happiness research 
(my colleague Judith Suissa's paper is one such example) quite rightly takes issue 
with a narrow emphasis on technique or prescription of skills that gives only 
superficial regard to the development of our capacities through the rich textures of 
each of our lives. Professor Koyasu highlights a richer notion of our engagement with 
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the world. The development of human capacities through a process of education 
cannot be easily separated from more fundamental questions relating to self 
motivation and self-determination and in tum these cannot be separated from the 
notion of freedom and the academic freedom he refers to. To grasp this richer sense of 
self learning and self determination as opposed to 'the mere inculcation of 
knowledge' it is helpful to consider an illustration provided by philosopher, Robert 
Pippin's address to undergraduates starting their degrees at Chicago: 
In his address, Pippin takes up the question self determination, and its 
embeddedness in the texture of our lives, calling upon his audience to consider on 
what basis they might be sitting in front of him at that moment. He asks them to dwell 
on why they had come to study. A free choice-he reflects-or a more guarded 
decision following parental pressure? He proceeds to ask them to consider what being 
free might mean in such an educational context. He suggests that unless they have a 
better idea of why they might be listening to him then they had not come 'freely'. 
More provocatively, he suggests that the reason to come to the University of Chicago 
might be to find out their reason to come. His point is that his audience may not have 
made a free decision in this sense but rather experienced a degree of alienation in so 
far as the decision to come is 'part of your life, [yet] while it was in fact produced by 
you, does not truly reflect the "you" that you understand yourself to be and identify 
with, and so this decision cannot in the deepest sense be yours' (Pippin, 2000). 
In alerting new students to the question of what it means to become educated, 
Pippin is communicating a counterintuitive notion of the development of our 
capacities as the actualisation of freedom steeped in the tradition of philosophy 
unfamiliar to the utilitarianism that informs programmes attempting to foster 
happiness in schools. To learn is also a process of which becoming free is an intrinsic 
part, for to be educated is not to 'know' a range of positions and perspectives (or to be 
inculcated as Professor Koyasu puts it), but rather to understand the reasons for 
holding particular beliefs and rejecting others. As Pippin illustrates with a story 
inspired by the writer David Lodge: 
... imagine all of us playing a version of the game where we try to name an idea 
crucial to our understanding of ourselves and of the modem world, and which has 
played a critical role in some of our decisions, some of the policies we have 
formulated, and many of the judgments and even condemnations we have 
formulated about others, but which we have no clue how to define and, no matter 
how much we have relied on it, no clue at all how to defend the idea from 
objections. Examples come easily to mind to all of us. What, after all, is a 'right'? 
(Pippin, 2000) 
In such a scenario we would not be familiar with the reasons for our actions and 
judgments and therefore we would be subject to them rather than in control of them: 
'[A] better form of self-understanding might make it possible to say that you led a life 
more "your own" , (Pippin, 2000). 
In this sense education is a freedom-enhancing process, to know the reasons why I 
act is to be a cause of myself rather than to be the subject of extraneous deter-
minations. The responsibility of a learner to interrogate and attempt to understand the 
reasons for a belief or perspective is developmental to both mind and free will: 
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One way of understanding the possibility of a free life-'your own life' -is to 
consider which of your past decisions you could truly be said to be able to 'stand 
behind,' where that means being able to defend or justify them when challenged, or 
even which you could claim to understand. 'Having reasons' in this sense for what 
you did, having something to say about 'why,' is a general condition for some event 
being considered an action of yours at all, and not having any reasons means it is very 
hard to understand any link between you and what conduct you engage in (Pippin, 
2000). 
This deeper notion of capability and self-determination is recognised by Professor 
Koyasu when he reminds us that: ' the best research in the world is ... conducted 
autonomously by researchers and shaped by their own academic interests.' He 
emphasises the importance of a vibrant research culture not governed by compliance 
but emphasising freedom and involving 'a sense of capability, a vital sense of life and 
a sense of achievement'. He goes on to refer to the notion of 'vitality' in the eastern 
tradition, a notion that values the connection between nature and society-and we 
might translate this concept of vitality in Aristotelian terms as energeia or in the 
language of Spinoza as conatus-involving an embedded idea of self determination 
and striving, far removed from a shallow modem liberal possessive conception of 
individual will that informs simplistic approaches to happiness. 
A second theme of philosophical interest in Professor Koyasu' s paper concerns 
questions of realism and of our notions of reality. Professor Koyasu reports a 
psychological study carried out with his colleagues to explore the relationships 
between optimism/pessimism, positive orientations, and feelings of happiness. A good 
deal of research on happiness points to the importance of positive attitudes as these 
are observed as more common in mentally healthy individuals than in depressed 
individuals and, as a result, are viewed as adaptive (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In 
contrast to the 'depressive realism' of depressed individuals 'positive illusions' are 
seen as healthy. Professor Koyasu brings to our attention research on positive 
illusions but he suggests a modification to the phrase, 'positive illusion is too strong 
to designate everyday cognition of ordinary people. Therefore, we will use the term 
positive orientation' . 
This area is interesting philosophically not merely due to the relationship between 
research into happiness and contemporary psychological research but in particular to 
more fundamental questions about veracity or truthfulness highlighted by findings on 
the adaptivity of positive illusions. In this area psychological research touches on 
questions normally found in the realm of epistemology. In probing the nature of 
realism the research addresses our common sense conceptions of what is real. 
Recent revisions to research on what is termed 'depressive realism' indicate the 
extent to which what we take to be veridical (truthful) is contestable. What was once 
considered to be the 'realism' of depressives at odds with the adaptive illusions of 
well adjusted people, is now being rethought as findings have shown a more subtle 
relation between so called 'positive illusions' and realism. Recent research on 
depressive realism (Msetfi, Murphy & Simpson, 2007) contests the assumption that 
depression could be explained by the 'realism' of the depressed person, i. e. that a 
depressive outlook involves a more realistic assessment of the world. In effect the 
description of realism or veracity assumed in original research in the area was 
insufficiently complex. Research has shown that rather than making a more accurate 
judgement 'depressed people were less sensitive to differences in contingency and 
contextual exposure' (Msetfi, Murphy & Simpson, 2007, p. 461). Msetfi and her 
colleagues 'propose that a context-processing difference between depressed and non-
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depressed people removes any objective notion of "realism" that was originally 
employed to explain the depressive realism effect'. Their research suggests that so 
called positive illusions might not be quite so illusory. In a similar vein Professor 
Koyasu's provides critical insight into recent research on dispositional optimism 
suggesting far greater complexity than was initially assumed. Drawing on his own 
research with colleagues in Kyoto he states 'that it is not clear whether optimism and 
pessimism are symmetrical or mutually independent' and argues for the need for 
further research in the area. 
Professor Koyasu's paper touches many points of interest spanning the disciplines 
and pointing in·directions beyond his own research in psychology. As such it provides 
a fitting opening for this conference by pointing to the value of interdisciplinary 
research fostered by events such as this colloquium. 
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